

Doubling Definite Determiners in German

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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate a special kind of determiner in German, which has gone unnoticed so far, namely DPs with doubled definite determiners (we dub them 'DD-DPs' for *doubled definite DPs*). We argue that they are non-referential expressions that not only constrain the current discourse model in which they can felicitously be used, but also a related speech context. We suggest that DD-DPs presuppose the existence of a speech context other than the current one, and that a definite or name must be used in the presupposed conversation. We also show that, with the help of the pragmatic principle 'Maximize Presupposition', DD-DPs give rise to an implicated presupposition of non-uniqueness.

1 Introduction

In German, there is a special kind of determiner that has gone unnoticed so far in the linguistic literature. This determiner is built up by conjoining two instances of the definite article *der*, *die*, *das* ('the') with *und* ('and'), and can be used with or without an overt NP complement (cf. (1a) and (1b), respectively).

- (1) a. *der und der Student*; *die und die Flasche*; *das und das Buch*
the and the student; the and the bottle; the and the book
b. *der und der* ; *die und die* ; *das und das*
the and the (masc.); the and the (fem.); the and the (neutr.)

In the following we will call these DPs with doubled definite determiner 'DD-DPs'. As a quick corpus search shows, DD-DPs occur more frequently in spoken than in written German: we checked three different corpora of the DWDS (Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache des 20. Jahrhunderts,

www.dwds.de). The frequency of DD-DPs in the corpus of spoken language is $1.32e^{-5}$, whereas it is lower in the mixed corpus and a corpus of newspaper articles ($3.65e^{-6}$ and $4.72e^{-7}$, respectively¹). For comparison, the specific indefinite determiner *ein gewisser* ('a certain') occurs with a frequency of $1,36e^{-4}$ in the spoken-language corpus, and is used slightly less frequently in the mixed and the newspaper corpus ($1,02e^{-4}$ and $2,98e^{-5}$, respectively). The definite determiner *der* ('the'), in contrast, is highly frequent in all three corpora (0,044 in the corpus of spoken language, 0,047 in the mixed corpus, and 0,040 in the corpus of newspaper articles). We consulted two further corpora as well (a random subset of the Web corpus deWaC and a corpus of the newspaper *TAZ*)², and the calculated occurrence frequencies are similar: in the Web corpus, DD-DPs occur with a frequency of $1,28e^{-6}$, the specific indefinite determiner *ein gewisser* ('a certain') with a frequency of $4,15e^{-6}$, and the definite determiner *der* ('the') with a frequency of 0,066. The frequencies for DD-DPs, the specific indefinite determiner and the definite determiner in the newspaper corpus are $1,20e^{-6}$, $4,79e^{-6}$, and 0,074, respectively. Admittedly, the frequencies of DD-DPs are not very high in all of the consulted corpora, but it should be noted that, first of all, DD-DPs occur in all five corpora and thus seem to be well-established expressions in both spoken and written German. Secondly, it is our intuition (and that of our informants) that DD-DPs are in fact very frequently used in spoken language. That this is not strongly reflected in the frequency counts might stem from the fact that the consulted corpus of spoken language is rather small, and, more generally, that there are hardly any large and balanced corpora of spoken German.

Consider the examples below for illustration of the use of DD-DPs:

- (2) Das Erste berichtet, er sei nachts um 24 Uhr von **dem und dem**
 the ARD reports he be at night at 24 hrs. by the and the
 angerufen worden und habe **das und das** gemacht.
 called was and have the and the done
 'The ARD reports that he was called by someone ('the and the') at
 24 hrs and that he did this and that ('the and the').'³

¹The corpus of spoken language contains 2.5 million tokens, the mixed corpus (DWDS-Kernkorpus) 100 million tokens, and the newspaper corpus (Berliner Zeitung) contains 252 million tokens. All three corpora are available at <http://www.dwds.de>.

²The random subset of the deWaC contains 89636193 tokens, the *TAZ*-corpus contains 96229448 tokens. Both corpora are available at <http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~CL/resources/index.html>

³Die Zeit online 2005: Der Kanzler und die lieben Zwerge.

- (3) Politiker, die meinen, dass man [...] für junge Frauen von 28
 politicians who mean that one for young women of 28
 [...] **das und das** machen muss, sehen das viel zu schlicht.
 the and the make must see this much too simple
 ‘Politicians who think that this and that (‘the and the’) should be
 done for 28-year-old women, simplify matters too much.’⁴
- (4) Skrupellos eingesetzt [liegt der wissenschaftliche Wert von
 unscrupulously employed lies the scientific value of
 Umfragen] nicht viel höher [...] als die Behauptung, dass
 surveys not much higher than the claim that
 neun von zehn Stars **die und die Seife** vorzögen.
 nine of ten stars the and the soap prefer
 ‘If used unscrupulously, the scientific value of surveys is not much
 higher than that of the claim that nine out of ten stars would prefer
 a certain soap (‘the and the soap’).’⁵

Examples (2) and (3) contain DD-DPs without NP complements, whereas the DD-DP in (4) is used with an overt NP complement (*Seife* (‘soap’)). It is striking that the DD-DP is embedded under a verb of saying in (2) and under a noun that relates to a speech context in (4) (*Behauptung* (‘claim’)). In (3), on the other hand, the DD-DP is embedded under a verb that is neither a verb of saying nor does it directly relate to a speech context (*meinen* (‘think’)). It is, however, very likely that the speaker knows the opinions of the respective politicians simply because they have stated them explicitly in public discussions. This means that also in (3) the DD-DP is embedded under a verb that is connected to a certain speech context in some sense. We take it that the use of DD-DPs is only licensed in such configurations, i.e., if it is embedded under a verb of saying or a related speech context can plausibly be inferred in some other way. In particular, we suggest that DD-DPs presuppose the existence of a speech context that is not the current one, and in which a definite or proper name was used.

In this paper, we will concentrate on DD-DPs used in truly embedded contexts, i.e., in indirect speech, only. It should be noted, however, that DD-DPs can also felicitously be used in direct quotes, as the following two examples illustrate:

⁴Die Zeit 1/2003, Politik: Keine Verhandlungen mit einer Schill-Partei.

⁵Die Zeit 33/1996, Modernes Leben: Umberto Eco: Die Umfrage.

- (5) Da hören wir sehr häufig: Ihr müsst es in **dem und dem**
 there hear we very often you must it in the and the
Zeitraum schaffen, egal, was es kostet.
 timeframe get done no matter what it costs
 ‘We often hear: you have to finish this within this and that (‘the and the’) timeframe, no matter how high the costs are.’⁶
- (6) Sie spielen mit der Playstation und unterhalten sich: **Der**
 they play with the Playstation and talk themselves the
und der hat Ärger gehabt in Buxtehude. **Der und der** ist von
 and the has trouble had in Buxtehude the and the is from
 der Schule geflogen.”
 the school expelled
 ‘They play with their Playstation and talk: “Someone (‘the and the’) got into trouble in Buxtehude. Someone (‘the and the’) was expelled from school.”’⁷

As noted above, however, DD-DPs are frequently used in indirect speech reports as well. In this paper we will concentrate on an analysis of DD-DPs in such indirect speech reports and leave the analysis of DD-DPs in direct quotes for future work.

Note also that, additionally to conjunctions of the definite article, adverb-conjunctions can be used in German as well (e.g., *dann und dann* (‘then and then’), *da und da* (‘there and there’), *so und so* (‘so and so’)). In this paper, however, we will be concerned with DD-DPs only⁸.

2 Semantic and Pragmatic Characteristics of DD-DPs

As we will see in this section, DD-DPs exhibit particular characteristics regarding their interpretation, and their felicitous use is restricted to certain contexts. We will explore the behaviour of DD-DPs in detail in the following.

⁶Die Zeit 42/2000, Wissen, Bildung: Retter in letzter Minute

⁷Die Zeit 46/2000, Leben: Mama, da ist Ei auf dem Teppich ...

⁸Note that this also means that we concentrate on *das* (‘the’)-conjunctions used as *determiners* only. As the use of *das und das* (‘the and the’) in example (2) illustrates, it seems that *das und das* (‘the and the’) can also be used to refer to events, but we will refrain from an analysis of these cases in this paper.

2.1 Non-Referential Readings of DD-DPs

Looking at examples (2) and (4) above, it might be tempting to conclude that DD-DPs not only presuppose a speech context in which a definite description or proper name was used, but also that they are referential expressions themselves and have to refer to particular individuals⁹. In contrast to definite descriptions and proper names, however, DD-DPs can also be used non-referentially (cf. (7) and (8)).

- (7) Wenn ich behaupte, **der und der** schreibe wie Mankell, glaubt
when I claim the and the write like Mankell believes
jeder sofort zu verstehen, was ich meine.
everyone immediately to understand what I mean
'If I claim that someone ('the and the') writes like Mankell, then
everyone immediately believes to know what I mean.'¹⁰
- (8) Niemand hört gerne, dass er **die und die Entscheidung** falsch
nobody hears gladly that he the and the decision wrong
getroffen hätte.
decided would-have
'Nobody likes to hear that he chose wrongly on some ('the and the')
occasion.'

In both cases, the DD-DP is in the scope of another quantifier: in (7) the DD-DP is embedded under a universal quantifier over possible worlds that is triggered by the conditional, and the DD-DP in (8) is in the scope of the quantifier *niemand* ('nobody'). The value of the DD-DP varies with the values of other quantifiers in (7) and (8) and can thus not be referentially fixed. In other words, the speaker is not referring to a particular author or a particular decision, respectively.

Furthermore, DD-DPs exhibit the same scope ambiguities as ordinary indefinites (cf. (9) and (10), cf. also Sudo, 2008, ex. 18, on Japanese wh-doublings):

- (9) Zwei Drittel der Leute mutmaßten, dass **ein Teilnehmer**
two thirds the people speculated that some participant
gewinnen wird.
win will

⁹We often translate DD-DPs without an NP complement with indefinites like *someone* or those with NP complements with *some* or *a certain* in English. Although this might not be the best translation, it is the best we could come up with. Non-German native speakers should bear in mind that DD-DPs involve only the definite article and do not realize any kind of overt indefiniteness marking.

¹⁰Die Zeit online 2005: Der Mord und die Grenzen des Verstehens.

- ‘Two thirds of the people speculated that some participant will win.’
- (10) Zwei Drittel der Leute mutmaßten, dass **der und der** gewinnen
 two thirds the people speculated that the and the win
 wird.
 will
 ‘Two thirds of the people speculated that someone (‘the and the’)
 will win.’

Just as the indefinite in (9), the DD-DP in (10) can take either wide or narrow scope over the numeral (*der und der* < $2/3$ or $2/3$ < *der und der*, respectively). The wide-scope reading of the DD-DP could be paraphrased along the lines of ‘there is someone, and two thirds of the people speculated that that person will win’, i.e., the person that is speculated to win is the same for each member of the set ‘two thirds of the people’. The narrow-scope reading, on the other hand, allows the speculated winner to be different for each one of the two thirds of the people. This could then be paraphrased as ‘For each member x of the set ‘two thirds of the people’ there is someone (y), such that x speculated that y will win’.

To sum up, the value of a DD-DP is not referentially fixed when the DD-DP is in the scope of another quantifier, and DD-DPs show the same scope ambiguities as ordinary indefinites. We therefore analyse DD-DPs as non-referential expressions, even though, at first glance, they seem to be used to refer to particular individuals.

2.2 Embedding Under *Verba Dicendi* and the Existence of a Related Speech Context

As we noted above, DD-DPs occur very frequently embedded under so-called *verba dicendi*, i.e., verbs of saying like *say*, *report*, *state*, etc. If such a verb is missing or a verb that relates to a speech context cannot plausibly be inferred from the context, the use of a DD-DP is unacceptable (cf. the contrast between (11) and (12)).

- (11) #**Die und die** ist von der Schule geflogen.
 the and the is from the school expelled
 #‘Someone (‘the and the’) has been expelled from school.’
- (12) Luise hat gesagt, dass **die und die** von der Schule geflogen ist.
 Luise has said that the and the from the school expelled was
 ‘Luise said that someone (‘the and the’) has been expelled from school.’

The out-of-the-blue utterance in (11) does not contain a *verbum dicendi*, nor can a verb that points to a speech context be inferred, and the DD-DP can thus not be used felicitously. The DD-DP in (12), on the other hand, is embedded under a *verbum dicendi* (*sagen* ('say')) and its use is felicitous. In contrast, the verbs in example (13) below (*glauben* ('believe') and *bedauern* ('regret')) are not verbs of saying, and the standard readings of these sentences are unacceptable.

- (13) #Luise glaubt / bedauert es, dass **die und die** von der Schule
 Luise believes / regrets it that the and the from the school
 geflogen ist.
 expelled was
 #'Luise believes / regrets that someone ('the and the') has been
 expelled from school.'

We take it that DD-DPs are generally used to indicate that the speaker is reporting something that has been stated in a speech context that is not the current one. *Verba dicendi* are normally used to make this relation to a different conversation explicit. The standard readings of sentences like those in (13), therefore, are unacceptable because the relevant verb is missing. It is, however, sometimes possible that such a verb can be inferred, even though it is not realized overtly, thus making the use of a DD-DP felicitous. The sentences in (13) could, e.g., in some situations, be interpreted in the following way: the hearer can infer from the speaker's utterance (and, in particular, from her using a DD-DP) that Luise has voiced her beliefs or regrets explicitly in a conversation that the speaker had with her, i.e., that there is indeed a speech act that the speaker is reporting. The sentences in (13) could then be paraphrased along the lines of 'Luise said that she believes / regrets that somebody has been expelled from school'¹¹.

2.3 Relatedness to a Definite or Name

Additionally to indicating that the speaker is conveying information that was acquired in a speech context that is not the current one, the use of DD-DPs also indicates that a definite description or proper name was used in that conversation (cf. the contrast between (14) and (15)).

- (14) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*

¹¹Note that this explanation is similar to the one we sketched above with regard to example (3).

Luise: **Der Student aus München / Ludwig** hat schon
 Luise: the student from Munich Ludwig has yet
 wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 again the window open left

'Luise: The student from Munich / Ludwig left the window open,
 yet again.'

b. *Speaker to hearer:*

Luise hat sich mal wieder beklagt, **der und der**
 Luise has herself yet again complained the and the
 hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 would-have yet again the window open left

'Luise complained again that someone ('the and the') left the
 window open, yet again.'

(15) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*

Luise: **Irgendjemand / Ein Freund von mir aus**
 Luise: someone a friend of mine from
München hat schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 Munich has yet again the window open left

'Luise: Someone / A friend of mine from Munich left the window
 open, yet again.'

b. *Speaker to hearer:*

#Luise hat sich mal wieder beklagt, **der und der**
 Luise has herself yet again complained the and the
 hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 would-have yet again the window open left

#'Luise complained again that someone ('the and the') left the
 window open, yet again.'

In both cases, the speaker is conveying information she acquired in a previous conversation with Luise. In (14a), a definite description (*der Student aus München* ('the student from Munich')) or a proper name (*Ludwig*) was used and the speaker was able to uniquely identify the referent in that conversation. The use of a DD-DP is felicitous in the report in (14b). In contrast, an indefinite (*irgendjemand* ('someone') or *ein Freund von mir aus München* ('a friend of mine from Munich')) is used in (15a), and the use of a DD-DP in the continuation in (15b) is infelicitous. Note that also the use of the specific indefinite *ein Freund von mir aus München* ('a friend of mine from

Munich') does not render (15b) felicitous, although it is usually assumed that the speaker can uniquely identify the individual she is referring to.

The requirement that a definite or proper name be used in the conversation that the DD-DP presupposes appears to be very strict, as the following example illustrates:

- (16) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*
 Luise: Ich habe gestern **jemanden / einen Mann**
 Luise: I have yesterday someone a man
 kennengelernt, der mir gut gefallen hat. **Er** hat mich ins
 met who me good appealed has he has me to the
 Kino eingeladen.
 cinema invited
 'Luise: Yesterday I met someone / a man who I liked. He invited me to the cinema.'
- b. *Speaker to hearer:*
 #Luise hat gesagt, sie hätte **den und den**
 Luise has said she would-have the and the
 kennengelernt.
 met
 #'Luise said that she met someone ('the and the').'
- c. *Speaker to hearer:*
 Luise hat gesagt, **der und der** hätte sie ins Kino
 Luise has said the and the would-have her to the cinema
 eingeladen.
 invited
 'Luise said that someone invited her to the cinema.'

In (16a), Luise introduces a new discourse referent with the help of a (complex) indefinite and later refers to that referent by using a pronoun. The sentence in (16b), in which the DD-DP can be regarded as substituting the indefinite, is not acceptable, whereas the DD-DP is used felicitously in the continuation in (16c). It seems that the acceptability of a DD-DP strongly depends on the linguistic expression that it relates to: even though, at the point in time at which the current conversation takes place, it is possible to uniquely identify the referent of the indefinite *jemand* ('someone') or *ein Mann* ('a man'), the use of a DD-DP is infelicitous. Luise uttered the indefinite, however, because the speaker was *not* able to uniquely identify the referent at the time (otherwise, following general conversational maxims,

Luise would have used a definite description or a proper name). In contrast, the pronoun, which we treat on a par with definite descriptions (cf. Elbourne 2005, and many others), allows for the felicitous use of a DD-DP in the speech report in (16c).

In most of the examples we discussed so far, the conversation the speaker is presupposing was assumed to have taken place sometime *before* the current speech context. It also seems that in many cases the speaker is conveying information that she herself acquired in a previous conversation (cf., e.g., examples (13)–(16)), and that she knows whether a definite description or proper name was used in that conversation. It should be noted, however, that, strictly speaking, the presupposed speech act need not necessarily have occurred previously to the current one, but the speaker can also refer to hypothetical or future conversations (for illustration cf. (17) and (18)). Furthermore, in some cases, the speaker was not (or will not be) a participant of the relevant conversation.

- (17) Morgen treffe ich mich mit Luise. Sie wird mir sicherlich
 tomorrow meet I myself with Luise she will me surely
 wieder erzählen, dass **der und der** ihr auf die Nerven gegangen
 again tell that the and the her on the nerves gone
 ist.
 is
 ‘I’ll meet Luise tomorrow. She will probably tell me again that some-
 one (‘the and the’) got on her nerves.’
- (18) Klaus trifft sich morgen vielleicht mit Luise. Sie wird ihm
 Klaus meets himself tomorrow maybe with Luise she will him
 sicherlich wieder erzählen, dass **der und der** ihr auf die Nerven
 surely again tell that the and the her on the nerves
 gegangen ist.
 gone is
 ‘Klaus may meet Luise tomorrow. She will probably tell him again
 that someone (‘the and the’) got on her nerves.’

In (17), the speaker is not reporting a previous conversation in which she acquired certain information, but she is rather hypothesizing about a future conversation she will have with Luise. In (18), a slightly more complicated version of (17), the conversation that the DD-DP links up to has not yet taken place and may even never actually occur, and the speaker will most likely not be a participant of that conversation either, i.e., she is talking about a possible future conversation between Klaus and Luise. Nonetheless,

the use of the DD-DP is felicitous. Similar considerations apply to examples (7) and (8) as well (repeated here as (19) and (20)):

- (19) Wenn ich behaupte, **der und der** schreibe wie Mankell, glaubt
 when I claim the and the write like Mankell believes
 jeder sofort zu verstehen, was ich meine.
 everyone immediately to understand what I mean
 ‘If I claim that someone (‘the and the’) writes like Mankell, then
 everyone immediately believes to know what I mean.’¹²
- (20) Niemand hört gerne, dass er **die und die Entscheidung** falsch
 nobody hears gladly that he the and the decision wrong
 getroffen hätte.
 decided would-have
 ‘Nobody likes to hear that he chose wrongly on some (‘the and the’)
 occasion.’

As we noted above, the DD-DPs in (19) and (20) are in the scope of another quantifier and their values are not referentially fixed. The universal in (19) quantifies over possible worlds, so the DD-DP can be regarded as being related to possible speech contexts. The speaker is thus not reporting information she acquired in a previous speech act, but she will have to be present in all possible contexts satisfying the antecedent of (19) (since she is the one making claims about someone’s writing like Mankell), and she will have to use a definite description or proper name in each case as well in order to fulfil the requirements on the felicitous use of DD-DPs. In (20), on the other hand, the speaker need not even be a participant of the conversations that *niemand* (‘nobody’) quantifies over. We suggest that it is indeed not necessary that the speaker knows whether a definite description or proper name is used in the relevant conversation, but her utterance will only be evaluated as being felicitous *if*, in the presupposed conversation(s), a definite is in fact used.

2.4 The NP Complement of DD-DPs

We saw above that DD-DPs can be used with or without an overt NP complement. It seems, however, that there is an interpretative difference between the two forms (cf. the contrast between (21) and (22)).

¹²Die Zeit online 2005: Der Mord und die Grenzen des Verstehens.

- (21) Luise hat sich beklagt, **der und der** hätte schon
 Luise has herself complained the and the would-have yet
 wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 again the window open left
 'Luise complained that someone ('the and the') left the window open,
 yet again.'
- (22) Luise hat sich beklagt, **der und der Mitarbeiter von**
 Luise has herself complained the and the assistant of
Peter hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 Peter would-have yet again the window open left
 'Luise complained that some ('the and the') assistant of Peter left the
 window open, yet again.'

As stated above, a definite or proper name must have been used in the conversation the speaker is reporting. But if the DD-DP is used with an NP complement, as in (22), it additionally indicates that the restrictor set of the DD-DP is not a singleton, i.e., that Peter has more than one assistant. The example in (23) makes this even more obvious.

- (23) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*
 Luise: **Der neuste Mitarbeiter von Peter** hat schon wieder
 Luise: the newest assistant of Peter has yet again
 das Fenster offen gelassen.
 the window open left
 'Luise: Peter's latest assistant left the window open, yet again.'
- b. *Speaker to hearer:*
 Luise hat sich beklagt, **der und der Mitarbeiter von**
 Luise has herself complained the and the assistant of
Peter hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 Peter would-have yet again the window open left
 'Luise complained that one of Peter's assistants ('the and the
 assistant of Peter') left the window open, yet again.'

It is clear from Luise's utterance that Peter has more than one assistant and that she is talking about one of them. The use of the DD-DP *der und der Mitarbeiter von Peter* ('the and the assistant of Peter') is felicitous because there are several referents the DD-DP could in principle be related to¹³.

¹³Note that the English translation *one of Peter's assistants* corresponds to our observations.

In contrast, in (24), a slightly modified version of (23), the follow-up utterance with a DD-DP with NP-complement is infelicitous.

- (24) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*
 Luise: **Der Mitarbeiter von Peter** hat schon wieder das
 Luise: the assistant of Peter has yet again the
 Fenster offen gelassen.
 window open left
 'Luise: Peter's assistant left the window open, yet again.'
- b. *Speaker to hearer:*
 Luise hat sich beklagt, **der und der (#Mitarbeiter**
 Luise has herself complained the and the assistant
von Peter) hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen
 of Peter would-have yet again the window open
 gelassen.
 left
 'Luise complained that one of Peter's assistants ('the and the
 (#assistant of Peter)') left the window open, yet again.'

The use of the definite in (24a) indicates that Peter has only one assistant. We take it that, since DD-DPs with an NP complement indicate that the restrictor NP denotes a non-singleton set, the use of a DD-DP in (24b) is infelicitous. An DD-DP without an NP complement, in contrast, can be used felicitously in such a context.

2.5 Summary of the Semantic and Pragmatic Characteristics of DD-DPs

Taking all of the above observations into account, here is a short summary of the characteristics regarding the interpretation of DD-DPs and their distributional restrictions:

DD-DPs ...

- (i) ... are non-referential expressions.
- (ii) ... presuppose the existence of a conversation other than the current one and hence are usually embedded under *verba dicendi* (sometimes the existence of a verb that relates to a speech context has to be inferred).

- (iii) ... also presuppose that a definite description or a proper name is used in the relevant conversation.
- (iv) ... indicate that the NP complement denotes a non-singleton set.

3 A Formal Analysis of DD-DPs

In the previous section we presented several semantic and pragmatic characteristics of DD-DPs, and a proper semantic analysis of DD-DPs should be able to account for these observations. In this section, we will argue that DD-DPs presuppose the existence of a speech context other than the current one, in which a definite description or proper name is used. With the help of the pragmatic principle 'Maximize Presupposition', it will follow from our analysis that the restrictor set of the DD-DP is a non-singleton set if the DD-DP is used with an overt NP complement. In cases where a DD-DP is used without an NP complement, we propose that some kind of default is at work and that the DD-DP is applied to a semantically vacuous NP-denotation such as $\lambda x.x = x$. We will also show that our analysis can account for all of the characteristics of DD-DPs.

3.1 Analysis of DD-DPs

Taking into account all of the observations we presented in the previous section, we suggest that DD-DPs are used in contexts in which (i) the speaker wants to be as faithful as possible to the way in which the relevant information was presented to her in a related conversation, i.e., she wants to indicate that a definite description or proper name was used, and in which (ii) the use of a (simple) definite description or proper name would be infelicitous because the relevant existence and uniqueness presuppositions are not part of the common ground of the current conversation and cannot be accommodated either. Suppose, for instance, the speaker and Luise have been talking about Luise's flatmate, who recently moved in with her, and that the speaker now wants to tell someone else, who has never heard of Luise's flatmate, about her conversation with Luise. It seems that in such contexts, the speaker has two possibilities: she could introduce new presuppositions which are accommodatable by the hearer (e.g., by using a complex definite like *der Student aus München, der Luise so auf die Nerven geht* ('the student from Munich who annoys Luise so much') or *der Typ, der neulich bei Luise eingezogen ist* ('the guy who recently moved in with Luise')), or she could use a DD-DP.

We suggest that a DD-DP carries the following information:

- (25) a. *At-issue semantics:*
 $\llbracket \text{der und der N} \rrbracket^c = \lambda Q. (\exists x \llbracket N \rrbracket^c(x) \wedge Q(x))$
- b. *Presupposition:*
 There is a related speech context c' such that $c \neq c'$ and x can be identified uniquely in c' with respect to a salient property $P \subseteq \llbracket N \rrbracket^c$

Note first that the at-issue semantics we assign to *der und der*-DPs¹⁴ in (25) is the usual semantics of the indefinite. DD-DPs that are used without overt NP complements can be seen as cases where the restrictor set $\llbracket N \rrbracket$ denotes a default property with little semantic content, i.e., something like $\lambda x.x = x$. The presuppositional content of DD-DPs we propose in (25b) ensures that the speaker is conveying information from a conversation other than the current one, and that a uniquely identifying expression, i.e., a definite description or a proper name, is used in that conversation.

Note also that, following the analysis in (25), DD-DPs can be regarded as being presuppositionally stronger than indefinites, but weaker than definites: DD-DPs have the same semantics as indefinites, but they additionally presuppose the existence of a conversation other than the current one in which a definite description or proper name is used. They are thus presuppositionally stronger than indefinites, which do not carry any presuppositions at all. On the other hand, we take it that DD-DPs are presuppositionally weaker than definites, since their presupposition constrains a speech context *other than* the current one. We therefore stipulate the following scale, where the expressions are ordered from left to right according to their presuppositional strength: $\langle \text{der}, \text{der und der}, \text{ein} \rangle (\langle \text{the}, \text{'the and the'}, \text{a} \rangle)$ ¹⁵.

In the next section we apply the analysis in (25) to the data discussed in Section 2.

3.2 Applying the Analysis

A proper semantic analysis of DD-DPs should be able to account for the semantic and pragmatic characteristics we presented in Section 2. In this section, we will show that the analysis proposed in (25) makes the correct predictions, and we will look at each of the characteristics in turn.

¹⁴We use the variant *der und der* here for simplicity only. It should be noted that the at-issue semantics (and the presuppositional content) we propose are, of course, the same for all DD-DPs, irrespective of different case or gender.

¹⁵Here and in the following, we use *der* ('the') as representing definite expressions in general (including, of course, definite descriptions, proper names, and pronouns), and *ein* ('a') as an abbreviation for indefinites.

3.2.1 Non-referentiality of DD-DPs

The fact that DD-DPs behave like ordinary indefinites in many respects, and that they should thus be regarded as non-referential expressions, directly follows from the at-issue semantics in (25a): we assign DD-DPs the standard semantics of the indefinite, thus accounting for examples like (7), (8), and (10).

3.2.2 Embedding Under Verba Dicendi and the Presupposed Speech Context

From our definition of the presuppositional content in (25b) it follows that DD-DPs are related to a speech context that is not the current one: the presupposed speech context c' is required to not be identical to the current context c .

It also follows from (25b) that DD-DPs are usually embedded under verba dicendi. The presupposition we assign to DD-DPs can then be bound directly to the context that is indicated by such a verb. In other cases, the existence of a related speech context can be inferred from the context and the relevant conversation can be accommodated. If, however, the DD-DP is used in a matrix clause, i.e., if it is unembedded, and the existence of a related speech context cannot be inferred from the current context, then the use of a DD-DP is infelicitous, because the presupposition can neither be bound nor accommodated (cf. (26), repeated from (11) above).

- (26) #**Die und die** ist von der Schule geflogen.
the and the is from the school expelled
#‘Someone (‘the and the’) has been expelled from school.’

In many cases, the presupposition of a DD-DP can easily be accommodated, as examples (3) and (13) showed. As usual, there seem to be gradual differences in how easily a given presupposition can be accommodated. Consider the contrast in (27) for illustration.

- (27) Luise hat **gehört** / ??**vergessen**, dass **die und die Prüfung**
Luise has heard / forgot that the and the exam
ausfällt.
be cancelled
‘Luise heard / ??forgot that a certain exam was cancelled.’

The verb *hören* (‘hear’) easily allows for the accommodation of a speech context other than the current one, whereas accommodation appears to be

more difficult if a verb like *vergessen* ('forget') is used, but not necessarily impossible. As we saw above, in many cases it is possible to infer that the speaker knows that someone else believes, thinks, heard, or forgot something *just because* the relevant information was explicitly stated in a particular conversation of which the speaker was a participant. While the fact that Luise heard about a certain event necessarily implies that there had been a speech context concerning this event, the fact that she forgot about a certain event does not imply that there was a speech context broaching the issue of this event. Hence the accommodation of a speech context is much harder for *hören* ('hear') than for *vergessen* ('forget').

3.2.3 Relatedness to a Definite or Name

Our definition in (25) also accounts for the fact that a definite description or proper name occurred in the conversation the speaker is presupposing. The object x whose existence is asserted according to (25a) is required to be uniquely identifiable with respect to some salient property in the presupposed speech context (cf. (25b)). If this is indeed the case, then, following general conversational maxims, a definite description or proper name will be used in that speech context.

3.2.4 The NP Complement of DD-DPs

We stipulated above that DD-DPs are presuppositionally stronger than indefinites, but weaker than ordinary definites, and suggested the following scale (cf. Section 3.1): $\langle \textit{der}, \textit{der und der}, \textit{ein} \rangle$ ($\langle \textit{the}, \textit{'the and the'}, a \rangle$). With the help of this newly ordered scale and the pragmatic principle 'Maximize Presupposition' of (Heim, 1991), our definition in (25) can account for the observation that DD-DPs with overt NP complements indicate that the restrictor set of the DD-DP is not a singleton. We argue that this characteristic property of DD-DPs is derivable as an implicated presupposition in the sense of (Sauerland, to appear).

It is well-established that certain expressions can give rise to *scalar implicatures* (cf. Grice 1975). Consider the famous example in (28) for illustration.

- (28) A to B: How many children do you have?
 B: I have 3 children.

Even though B's answer in principle allows for the possibility that he has 3 or more than 3 children, the utterance in (28) gives rise to the (scalar) implicature that B has 3 *and no more than 3* children. Whether or not such an implicature arises, however, usually depends on the communicative goal of the speech act participants (cf. (29), Grice 1975).

- (29) A to B: Look, everyone who has 3 children gets free entrance.
 B: Oh, great! I (do) have 3 children.

In (29), the implicature we noted with regard to the example in (28) does not arise, i.e., B's utterance may very well be felicitous if he has more than 3 children. Generally, (scalar) implicatures are explained with the help of ordered sets, or scales. For instance, $\langle \dots, 4, 3, 2, 1 \rangle$ would be an appropriate scale to account for the scalar implicature in (28): here, the items are ordered according to their informational strength, i.e., 4 is informationally stronger than 3, which in turn is stronger than 2, and so on. Following the Gricean Maxims of Quality and Quantity, a speaker is required to make her utterance as informative as possible. The scalar implicature in (28) now arises from the fact that – assuming that all speech-act participants are co-operative and follow the conversational maxims – A can infer that B does not have more than 3 children, because B, making his utterance as informative as possible, would have used an informationally stronger expression like *four* or *five* otherwise. In (29), where it is not under discussion how many children B has, but simply whether he will get free entrance the implicature does not arise.

In order to explain certain phenomena regarding the use of the definite and the indefinite article, Heim (1991) suggested to use scales as well, which operate on presuppositions and not only on the at-issue semantics of expressions. In the scale $\langle \textit{the}, a \rangle$, the items are ordered not according to their informational, but according to their presuppositional strength: they both have the same semantics, but the definite article *the* carries existence and uniqueness presuppositions, whereas the indefinite article *a* does not carry any presuppositions at all and is hence presuppositionally weaker than the definite article. Heim (1991) further suggested that the use of the definite and the indefinite article is governed by the pragmatic principle 'Maximize Presupposition' (MP) which states that a speaker should presuppose as much as possible in her utterances (Heim, 1991, p. 515) (cf. also Percus 2006; Schlenker 2006a, 2008; Sauerland to appear). With the help of this principle one can account for the contrast between examples like (30) and (31) (cf. Heim 1991, ex. 118).

- (30) **The** head of Mary, Queen of Scots fell to the ground.
 (31) #**A** head of Mary, Queen of Scots fell to the ground.

The oddness of (31) can be explained along the following lines: following MP, a co-operative speaker should presuppose as much as possible in her utterances and should thus not use the indefinite article in situations where the definite article could have been used. It is common knowledge that people in general, and Mary, Queen of Scots in particular, have exactly one head,

the use of the indefinite in (31) therefore violates MP, whereas the definite in (30) is felicitous.

The intuition behind the oddness of (31) is that it seems to suggest the existence of more than one head of Mary, Queen of Scots. Or, as Sauerland (to appear) puts it, the oddness of examples like (31) results from the intuition that ‘the use of the indefinite article generally leads to a presupposition which is complementary to that of the definite article – a presupposition that there not be a unique individual x satisfying the restrictor’ (Sauerland, to appear, p. 6). Following (Sauerland, to appear) further, this ‘non-uniqueness presupposition’ is actually an implicature, or an *implicated presupposition*¹⁶: ‘The idea of an implicated presupposition is that it is derived like an implicature, but in the presuppositional domain’ (Sauerland, to appear, p. 4). We can then explain the implicated presupposition of non-uniqueness in (31) as follows: we assume that the speaker is co-operative and follows general conversational maxims, in particular MP. The speaker does *not* utter (30), so the hearer can infer that the use of the definite article would not have been felicitous, i.e., that Mary, Queen of Scots did not have a unique head. The use of the indefinite article in (31) thus gives rise to an implicated presupposition of non-uniqueness. Building on Heim’s (1991) and Sauerland’s (to appear) insights, we suggest that the same mechanisms are at work when using (or interpreting) DD-DPs.

We used the example in (32) (repeated here from (24)) to illustrate that DD-DPs with an NP complement indicate that the restrictor set of the DD-DP is a non-singleton set.

- (32) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*

Luise: **Der Mitarbeiter von Peter** hat schon wieder das
 Luise: the assistant of Peter has yet again the
 Fenster offen gelassen.
 window open left

‘Luise: Peter’s assistant left the window open, yet again.’

- b. *Speaker to hearer:*

Luise hat sich beklagt, **der und der (#Mitarbeiter**
 Luise has herself complained the and the assistant
von Peter) hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen
 of Peter would-have yet again the window open

¹⁶Note that implicated presuppositions in Sauerland’s (to appear) sense are not, in fact, presuppositions, but implicatures, even though his own terminology is not always clear with regard to this issue.

gelassen.
left

'Luise complained that one of Peter's assistants ('the and the' (#assistant of Peter)) left the window open, yet again.'

In (32), the speaker's use of a DD-DP gives rise to an implicated presupposition of non-uniqueness and, therefore, the continuation with a DD-DP with NP-complement in (32b) is infelicitous: we take it that it is clear from the utterance in (32a) that Peter has exactly one assistant. If this is the case, the speaker should have used a definite description or proper name in (32b) (as required by MP)¹⁷. Since the speaker chose to use the DD-DP *der und der Mitarbeiter von Peter* ('the and the assistant of Peter') instead, the hearer can infer that the use of a definite would not have been felicitous, i.e., that Peter has more than one assistant, thus giving rise to an implicated presupposition of non-uniqueness. Note that the use of a DD-DP *without* an overt NP complement (*der und der* ('the and the')) is felicitous. According to our analysis in (25), *der und der* would be applied to the semantically vacuous predicate $\lambda x.x = x$ in this case, resulting in the implicated presupposition 'there is a non-unique thing', which is so trivial that it will hold in almost all contexts.

Summing up, we suggest that the use of a DD-DP is required if (i) a definite description or proper name cannot be used, because the relevant presuppositions are not satisfied in the current speech context, and if (ii) an indefinite cannot be used, because the speaker wants to be faithful to the way in which the reported information was presented in the presupposed conversation, i.e., if she wants to indicate that a definite or proper name was used in the relevant conversation. There are some cases, however, in which it seems that both a DD-DP and an indefinite can be used felicitously (cf. (33)), which should be impossible according to our reasoning.

(33) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*

Luise: **Der neuste Mitarbeiter von Peter** hat schon wieder
Luise: the newest assistant of Peter has yet again
das Fenster offen gelassen.
the window open left

'Luise: Peter's latest assistant left the window open, yet again.'

¹⁷Note that the presuppositional scale we are assuming is $\langle \textit{der}, \textit{der und der}, \textit{ein} \rangle$ ($\langle \textit{the}, \textit{'the and the'}, a \rangle$). Note also that, in our example, the presuppositions carried by a definite description like *der Mitarbeiter von Peter* ('Peter's assistant') can be accommodated easily.

- b. Luise hat sich mal wieder beklagt, **der und der**
 Luise has yet again complained the and the
 (**Mitarbeiter von Peter**) / **ein Mitarbeiter von Peter**
 assistant of Peter a assistant of Peter
 hätte schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 would-have yet again the window open left
 'Luise complained again that someone ('the and the') (some as-
 sistant of Peter ('the and the assistant of Peter')) / an assistant
 of Peter left the window open, yet again.'

The restrictor set of the DD-DP in (33b) is a non-singleton set (it is clear from (33a) that Peter has more than one assistant), the use of a DD-DP with an NP complement is thus felicitous. But, as we noted, also the indefinite *ein Mitarbeiter von Peter* ('an assistant of Peter') seems to be acceptable here. We suggest that it depends on the communicative goal of the speech-act participants whether the use of an indefinite or of a DD-DP is more appropriate. If the context is such that what has been said is under discussion (i.e., if the Question under Discussion is something like *What did Luise say?*), then the use of a DD-DP is preferred over that of an indefinite if the speaker cannot use a definite description or proper name in the current context¹⁸: following the Gricean Maxims of Quality and Quantity (cf. Grice 1975), the speaker will be as faithful to the presupposed speech context as possible, i.e., she will want to keep as many presuppositions as possible, without adding any new ones. In such a case then, the use of an indefinite is less appropriate because of MP: the DD-DP *can* be used felicitously and is presuppositionally stronger than the indefinite, thus the use of a DD-DP seems to be the preferred alternative. In contexts in which the Question under Discussion is different (e.g., *What did Luise do?*), however, the speaker is not required to preserve as many presuppositions from the reported utterance as possible. 'Downgrading' to an indefinite is possible in such situations, and it is acceptable to use the presuppositionally weaker indefinite. Consider the following two examples for further illustration:

- (34) a. *Previous conversation between Luise and the speaker:*
 Luise: Ludwig lässt immer die Fenster offen.
 Luise: Ludwig leaves always the windows open

¹⁸We are referring to preferences here, rather than clear-cut (in)acceptability, because it seems that some native speakers judge the indefinite as being felicitous as well in situations where what has been said is under discussion. We suggest, however, that these judgements may be due to the fact that the alternative of a DD-DP, in addition to definites and indefinites, is not available to all native speakers.

'Luise: Ludwig always leaves the windows open.'

b. *Hearer to speaker:*

Ich habe gehört, Luise hat sich beschwert. Was hat sie denn
I have heard Luise has complained what has she then
gesagt?
said

'I heard Luise was complaining. What did she say?'

c. *Speaker to hearer:*

Luise meinte, dass **der und der** / ??**jemand** immer die
Luise holds that the and the someone always the
Fenster aufflässt.
windows leave open

'Luise said that someone ('the and the') / ??someone always
leaves the windows open.'

(35) a. *Previous conversation between Luise and the speaker:*

Luise: Ludwig lässt immer die Fenster offen.

Luise: Ludwig leaves always the windows open

'Luise: Ludwig always leaves the windows open.'

b. *Hearer to speaker:*

Warum waren bei Luise heute eigentlich alle Fenster offen?
why were at Luise today actually all windows open

'Say, why were all of Luise's windows open today?'

c. *Speaker to hearer:*

Luise meinte, dass **der und der** / **jemand** immer die
Luise holds that the and the someone always the
Fenster aufflässt.
windows leave open

'Luise said that someone ('the and the') / someone always leaves
the windows open.'

The related conversation (here, a previous conversation between the speaker and Luise) is the same in both examples (cf. (34a) and (35a)). From (34a) it follows that the hearer wants to know what it is that Luise said, i.e., the Question under Discussion is something like *What did Luise say?* As argued above, in such cases, the use of a DD-DP is preferred over that of an indefinite, because the speaker wants to be as faithful as possible to the reported conversation. This means that the indefinite *jemand* ('someone') here is less

acceptable, since it is presuppositionally weaker than the competing DD-DP and, according to MP, the speaker should aim at using the expression with the most presuppositions. In (35b), on the other hand, the Question under Discussion that is established is different and could be paraphrased as *Why were Luise's windows open?*. The indefinite in the follow-up utterance in (35c) can be used felicitously, as can the DD-DP. Similarly to scalar implicatures (cf. examples (28) and (29)), the implicature (or, in Sauerland's (to appear) terms, the implicated presupposition) that the requirements on the competing presuppositionally stronger items are not fulfilled (because the speaker chose a presuppositionally weak expression, such as an indefinite) does not arise in all contexts. This means that – depending on the communicative goal of the speech-act participants – the default case, in which the speaker wants to presuppose as much as possible in her utterance and hence uses a DD-DP whenever possible, can sometimes be over-ridden, thus making the use of an indefinite acceptable in certain situations.

3.3 Summary

In this section we argued for a presuppositional analysis of DD-DPs (cf. (25)), and we have shown that, with the help of the pragmatic principle MP and the notion of implicated presuppositions, the semantic and pragmatic characteristics of DD-DPs can be accounted for under this analysis. Here is a short summary of the properties of DD-DPs and of the way they can be explained:

DD-DPs ...

- (i) ... are non-referential expressions.
 ⇔ by definition of the at-issue semantics of DD-DPs in (25a)
- (ii) ... presuppose the existence of a conversation other than the current one and hence are usually embedded under *verba dicendi* (sometimes the existence of a verb that relates to a speech context has to be inferred).
 ⇔ by definition of the presuppositional content of DD-DPs in (25b)
- (iii) ... also presuppose that a definite description or a proper name is used in the relevant conversation.
 ⇔ by definition of the presuppositional content of DD-DPs in (25b)
- (iv) ... indicate that the NP complement denotes a non-singleton set.
 ⇔ by an implicated presupposition that can be derived with the help of 'Maximize Presupposition'

4 Discussion

In the previous section, we presented a formal analysis of DD-DPs that can account for the characteristics regarding the interpretation of DD-DPs and their distributional restrictions. In this section we discuss our results critically and point to possible directions for further research.

4.1 A Related Approach: (Sudo, 2008) on Japanese *wh-doublets*

In Japanese, there appear to be expressions that share some of the properties of DD-DPs. As Sudo (2008) has argued, so-called *wh-doublets* can be used in closed quotations only¹⁹. Consider example (36) for illustration (cf. Sudo 2008, ex. 15):

- (36) John-wa “Bill-ga **dare-dare-o** aishiteiru” to itta.
John-TOP “Bill-NOM who-who-ACC love” C said
'John said “Bill loves *X*”.'

It seems that *wh-doublets* can only appear in place of referring expressions (i.e., definite descriptions or proper names), and Sudo proposes that ‘they are indefinites [quantifying] over referring expressions’ (Sudo, 2008, p. 629). We will not go into the details of this analysis here, for our purposes it suffices to know that the sentence in (36) is interpreted as ‘For some expression *X* such that *X* denotes a person, John said “Bill loves *X*”’ (Sudo, 2008, p. 622). Japanese *wh-doublets* are analysed by Sudo (2008) as indefinites that can only substitute referential expressions and that can only be used in closed quotations. The first property is reminiscent of the characteristic features of DD-DPs, and, indeed, also DD-DPs can be used in closed quotations, as we pointed out in Section 1: examples (5) and (6) (the latter of which we repeat here as (37)) illustrated this use of DD-DPs.

- (37) Sie spielen mit der Playstation und unterhalten sich: “**Der**
they play with the Playstation and talk themselves the
und der hat Ärger gehabt in Buxtehude. **Der und der** ist von
and the has trouble had in Buxtehude the and the is from
der Schule geflogen.”
the school expelled

¹⁹Here is a list of the possible *wh-doublets* from (Sudo, 2008, p. 614): *dare-dare* (‘who-who’), *nani-nani* (‘what-what’), *itsu-itsu* (‘when-when’), *doko-doko* (‘where-where’), *dore-dore* (‘which-which’), *ikura-ikura* (‘how.much-how.much’), *ikutsu-ikutsu* (‘how.many-how.many’).

‘They play with their Playstation and talk: “Someone (‘the and the’) got into trouble in Buxtehude. Someone (‘the and the’) was expelled from school.”’²⁰

Despite these apparent similarities, there are empirical differences between Japanese wh-doublets and German DD-DPs, however. Firstly, wh-doublets can be used embedded among foreign words (cf. (38), Sudo 2008, ex. 12), whereas DD-DPs cannot (cf. (39)):

- (38) Galileo-wa [nani-nani si muove to] itta.
Galileo-TOP “what-what si muove” C said
'Galileo said “X si muove”.'
- (39) Galileo sagte: “#Das und das si muove.”
Galileo said the and the si muove
'Galileo said “#Something (‘the and the’) si muove”.'

Secondly, and crucially, DD-DPs are used not only in closed quotations, but are also frequently used in indirect speech reports, for which we offer an account in this paper. Possibly Sudo’s (2008) analysis of Japanese wh-doublets is applicable to the German cases of DD-DPs in direct quotes, but we leave the task of spelling out the details of an analysis of DD-DPs in direct quotes for future work.

4.2 Treatment of *say* Reports in (Brasoveanu and Farkas, 2007)

Brasonveanu and Farkas (2007) propose a semantic analysis of *say* reports, and an obvious question that arises is whether this account could be applied to DD-DPs as well, even though, of course, the DPs we are concerned with in this paper lie well outside the scope of Brasoveanu and Farkas’ (2007) account. The most striking parallel between Brasoveanu and Farkas’ (2007) proposal and our analysis of DD-DPs is that DD-DPs could be regarded as being licensed in *say* reports only, since they can only be used felicitously if the presupposition of the existence of a relevant speech act that the DD-DP links up to can be either bound or accommodated. But, as we will see shortly, the requirements that Brasonveanu and Farkas (2007) propose on the preservation of presuppositions are too strong to allow for an adequate analysis of DD-DPs within their framework.

In (Brasonveanu and Farkas, 2007), reports of assertive speech acts are analysed as being anaphorically related to a particular conversation in which

²⁰Die Zeit 46/2000, Leben: Mama, da ist Ei auf dem Teppich ...

the reported state of affairs was mentioned. To account for the fact that certain *say* reports are infelicitous (cf. (40), Brasonveanu and Farkas 2007, ex. 17), the authors introduce a ‘faithfulness to meaning dimensions’ requirement that the complement of *say* has to fulfil (Brasonveanu and Farkas, 2007, pp. 28ff).

- (40) a. Mary: *Peter ate some of the cake.*
b. Sam: #*Mary said that there is some cake left.*
(or: #*Mary said that Peter didn’t eat the whole cake.*)

According to (Brasonveanu and Farkas, 2007), examples like the one in (40) show that, for instance, it is not possible to report the implicatures of the source sentence as having been *said*. More generally, *say* reports have to fulfil the following requirement with regard to their source sentence: ‘the at-issue entailments of the former must follow from the at-issue entailments of the latter, the implicatures of the former must follow from the implicatures of the latter and, finally, the presupposition/at-issue content division of the source speech act must be preserved in the report’ (Brasonveanu and Farkas, 2007, p. 28). Additionally to the example in (40), Brasonveanu and Farkas (2007) use the example in (41) (cf. Brasonveanu and Farkas 2007, ex. 25) to illustrate the validity of their ‘faithfulness to meaning dimensions’ requirement:

- (41) a. Sam: *Mary stopped smoking.*
b. Sue: #*Sam said that Mary used to smoke.*
c. Sue: #*Sam said that Mary used to smoke and then she stopped.*

Sue’s utterances in (41b) and (41c) are regarded as being infelicitous reports of the speech act in (41a), because the division between the at-issue semantics (*Mary stopped smoking*) and the presupposition of the source sentence in (41a) (*Mary used to smoke*) is not preserved. If we take a closer look at the speech-act participants’ communicative goals that might be involved in this example, however, the judgement might be different. According to our intuitions, both (41b) and (41c) are, in fact, acceptable in certain contexts, e.g., if the Question under Discussion in the current conversation is to name people who used to smoke or who stopped smoking. Similarly, we also judge the examples in (40) as being felicitous in certain contexts, e.g., if (40b) is uttered by Sam after he realises that the whole cake is gone and he now complains that he was misinformed by Mary’s utterance of (40). Possibly, Brasonveanu and Farkas (2007) would agree and would judge these cases as ones they explicitly exclude from their considerations by stating that they are only concerned with pure indirect uses of *say* and not with parenthetical or direct quotative uses.

Turning back to our main focus in this paper, DD-DPs, we already saw in Section 3.2.4 that, in some situations, the communicative goal of the speech-act participants needs to be taken into account. Consider example (42), a slightly modified version of (14) above:

- (42) a. *Previous conversation between the speaker and Luise:*
 Luise: **Der Student aus München / Ludwig** hat schon
 Luise: the student from Munich Ludwig has yet
 wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 again the window open left
 'Luise: The student from Munich / Ludwig left the window open,
 yet again.'
- b. *Speaker to hearer:*
 Luise hat sich mal wieder beklagt, **jemand** hätte
 Luise has herself yet again complained someone would-have
 schon wieder das Fenster offen gelassen.
 yet again the window open left
 'Luise complained again that someone left the window open, yet
 again.'

As we noted above, the continuation in (42b), where the indefinite *jemand* ('*someone*') is used, may be acceptable, depending on the Question under Discussion of the current conversation. Note also that in (42) we are clearly concerned with a *say* report in Brasoveanu and Farkas' (2007) sense. The indefinite, however, does not carry any presuppositions at all, i.e., the presuppositions associated with the definite description or the proper name in the original report in (42a) are *not* preserved. Furthermore, depending on the common ground of the current conversation, it is not always possible to keep all presuppositions, i.e., it is not always possible to preserve the at-issue content / presupposition division that (Brasonveanu and Farkas, 2007)'s 'faithfulness to meaning dimensions' requirement dictates: if, as was the case in most of the examples we considered so far, a definite description or proper name was used in the conversation that a given *say* report is related to, and if the relevant existence and uniqueness presuppositions of the definite are not satisfied in the common ground of the current speech context (and cannot be accommodated either), then the required division *cannot* be preserved. All in all, it seems that the requirement that the distinction between the at-issue content and the presuppositions (as in (41) and (42)) or implicatures (as in (40)) of the source sentence have to be preserved in reports of assertive speech acts is too strong.

4.3 Our Presuppositional Analysis

A potential problem for our analysis is that, from the perspective of the hearer, the presupposition of DD-DPs we propose in (25b) can never be falsified, since there always is a speaker-hearer asymmetry²¹. This problem may be resolvable, however, if we follow (Schlenker, 2007): Schlenker, discussing expressives, argues that certain expressions carry a particular kind of presupposition, namely 'self-fulfilling presuppositions' which are always satisfied, irrespective of any speaker-hearer asymmetries. A self-fulfilling presupposition is 'one which is *indexical* (it is evaluated with respect to a context), *attitudinal* (it predicates something of the mental state of the agent in that context), and sometimes *shiftable* (the context of evaluation need not be the context of the actual utterance)' (Schlenker, 2007, p. 237). The presupposition of DD-DPs could accordingly be regarded as being both indexical and shiftable. The remaining question, however, is whether it is also attitudinal in Schlenker's (2007) sense. *If* that were the case, we could regard the presupposition of DD-DPs as systematically informative, i.e., as a self-fulfilling presupposition (cf. Schlenker, 2007, p. 240), and the problem that the presupposition we assign to DD-DPs can never be falsified by the hearer could be resolved.

Another puzzle that arises from our analysis is that unembedded DD-DPs are not acceptable, even in cases where the preceding discourse would satisfy the DD-DP's presupposition. Consider the example in (43) for illustration.

- (43) Ich habe gestern mit Luise geredet und sie hat mir von ihrem
I have yesterday with Luise spoken and she has me of her
Arbeitsalltag erzählt. #**Der und der** lässt immer die Fenster
work routine told the and the leaves always the windows
offen.
open
'I spoke to Luise yesterday and she told me about her work routine.
#Someone ('the and the') always leaves the windows open.'

At the point where the DD-DP in (43) is evaluated, it is clear from the speaker's utterance that there indeed exists a relevant speech context other than the current one, namely a previous conversation between the speaker and Luise. It seems that the presupposition we propose in (25b) can be bound to that context, nonetheless the use of the DD-DP is infelicitous. And, adding to the confusion even more, DD-DPs appear to become acceptable if they appear as items in a list as in the following example:

²¹This problem also arises for certain presuppositional approaches to specific indefinites (e.g., Ionin 2006; Krifka 2001; Schlenker 2006b; Cresti 1995; Jäger 2007; Yeom 1998).

- (44) Ich habe gestern mit Luise geredet und sie hat mir von ihrem
 I have yesterday with Luise spoken and she has me of her
 Arbeitsalltag erzählt. **Der und der** lässt immer die Fenster
 work routine told the and the leaves always the windows
 offen, **die und die** setzt nie neuen Kaffee auf und **der und der**
 open the and the puts never new coffee on and the and the
 kommt immer zu spät.
 comes always too late
 'I spoke to Luise yesterday and she told me about her work routine.
 Someone ('the and the') always leaves the windows open, someone
 else ('the and the') never brews new coffee, and someone else ('the
 and the') is always late.'

The analysis we propose in (25) admittedly cannot account for this particular use of DD-DPs in any straight-forward fashion, but further work may provide new insights.

4.4 Evidentiality

Returning to the example in (43), it seems that expressions like *sollen* ('shall') or *angeblich* ('allegedly') make the use of DD-DPs in matrix clauses, i.e., in unembedded contexts, acceptable (cf. (45)).

- (45) Ich habe gestern mit Luise geredet und sie hat mir von ihrem
 I have yesterday with Luise spoken and she has me of her
 Arbeitsalltag erzählt. **Der und der** lässt **angeblich** immer die
 work routine told the and the leaves allegedly always the
 Fenster offen. / **Der und der soll** immer die Fenster offen
 windows open the and the shall always the windows open
 lassen.
 leave
 'I spoke to Luise yesterday and she told me about her work routine.
 Someone ('the and the') apparently always leaves the windows open.
 / Someone ('the and the') is said to always leave the windows open.'

In contrast to (43), the insertion of expressions that can be regarded as evidential expressions (like, e.g., *sollen* ('shall') or *angeblich* ('allegedly'), cf., e.g., Schenner 2008) leads to the acceptability of DD-DPs in (45). It thus seems that the felicitous use of DD-DPs is somehow connected to evidentiality. This would correspond nicely to our observation that the information the speaker is conveying must have been presented in a certain way (i.e., with

the help of a definite description or a proper name) and that the information is based on a certain source (i.e., a presupposed speech context). But, as of yet, we have not pursued this line of thought any further.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we have given a semantic analysis of DPs with doubled definite determiners in German that, together with the pragmatic principle of ‘Maximize Presuppositions’ and the notion of implicated presuppositions, can account for the use of DD-DPs. The main characteristics of DD-DPs are that they are related to a conversation other than the current one, and that they indicate that a definite description or proper name is used in that conversation. Additionally, if used with an NP complement, DD-DPs give rise to the implicated presupposition that the restrictor set of the DD-DP is not a singleton.

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